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Using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1999-2005 we empirically investigate 
the politics involved in IMF economic forecasts. We find a systematic bias in growth and 
inflation forecasts. Our results indicate that countries voting in line with the US in the UN 
General Assembly receive lower inflation forecasts. As the US is the Fund’s major 
shareholder, this result supports the hypothesis that the Fund’s forecasts are not purely 
based on economic considerations. We further find inflation forecasts are systematically 
biased downwards for countries with greater IMF loans outstanding relative to GDP, 
indicating that the IMF engages in “defensive forecasting.” Countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime also receive low inflation forecasts. Considering the detrimental 
effects that inflation can have under such an exchange rate regime, we consider this 
evidence consistent with the Fund’s desire to preserve economic stability. 
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1. Introduction  
A core responsibility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to promote a dialogue 
among its member countries on the national and international consequences of their 
economic and financial policies. This process of monitoring and consultation is normally 
referred to as “surveillance.” In a globalized world, where the economic and financial 
policies of one country may affect many other countries, international cooperation to 
monitor economic developments on a global scale is essential.
1 Implicit in its original 
mandate, the IMF’s responsibility to oversee the international monetary system was made 
explicit when the Articles of Agreement were amended in 1978. In the words of the 
deputy director of IMF External Relations, “The IMF usually describes surveillance as its 
most central and important activity, and it absorbs the largest part of its budgetary 
resources” (Hacche 2007, 98). At the 2006 spring meetings, the IMF was actually given 
the duty to devote more effort to “multilateral” surveillance. In order to look for 
collective solutions, the IMF is to focus on how the policies of each member impacts the 
policies and outcomes of every other member in turn.
2 The surveillance role of the IMF 
will probably become even more important as the Fund seems to be getting out of the 
lending business. 
The IMF regularly forecasts major macroeconomic variables in various developed 
and developing countries. The goals are both to monitor the world economy and also to 
help evaluate the effectiveness of the programs of economic reform it sponsors in the 
developing world. The IMF makes specific projections for the “performance criteria” of 
countries under such programs to help assess the degree of implementation of required 
policy changes (known as “conditionality”). Specifically, the IMF focuses on GDP 
growth, inflation, the rate of unemployment, balance of payments, current account, 
foreign trade, and fiscal indicators. Forecasts for these variables are published bi-annually 
(in April and September) in World Economic Outlook ( WEO),  which also discusses 
prospects for the world economy and provides in-depth analyses of specific issues. The 
analyses and projections contained in WEO then become a significant source for other 
                                                 
1 Such importance has actually been confirmed by the recent episodes of financial crises.  
2 The Economist, April 27th 2006. Also see the description of the IMF’s Medium Term Strategy, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2006/041806.htm (accessed September 9, 2007).   3
forecasts of global economic activity, and a key element in the Fund’s multilateral 
surveillance activities. Given the important role of surveillance, it is vital that the task be 
performed accurately.
3 
The forecasts published in WEO are described as the product of a review of world 
economic developments, which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers 
through its consultations with member countries (e.g., see WEO 2006). There is no 
question that initial projections are based on an econometric model.
4 Subsequent 
adjustment of forecast estimates leave much discretionary leeway for political influence, 
however, as well as potentially self-serving adjustments people at the IMF may have an 
incentive to make. 
Previous studies of IMF surveillance have used statistical tests to determine the 
accuracy of forecasts published in WEO (among others, see Artis 1988, 1997; 
Barrionuevo 1993; Beach et al. 1999; Loungani 2000; Batchelor 2000; Pons 2000; 
Aldenhoff 2007; Timmermann 2007).
5 Beach et al. (1999) find evidence that the IMF 
forecasts for developing regions have been overly optimistic: WEO forecasts 
overestimated output and underestimated inflation. This was not the case of the major 
industrialized countries whose forecasts of GDP and inflation were both unbiased and 
efficient. In addition, these authors found that the error term was increasing with the size 
of the IMF loan a country receives, suggesting some kind of support of the Fund’s 
lending activity. While this kind of “defensive forecasting,” may be disappointing, the 
result stands to reason. IMF loans are typically tied to policy conditions. Forecasts for 
countries receiving IMF loans may mirror the expected outcome of the policies suggested 
by the IMF, and this bias would result in forecasts that are too optimistic. A bias in the 
other direction would be quite strange. It would indicate that the IMF itself expects its 
own recommended policies to be ineffective. 
                                                 
3 Specifically, since the importance of conditional lending is fading, a good rate in terms of IMF 
surveillance could possibly overtake the role that conditionality had as a signal of a country’s “good 
performance” in reassuring private investors (see Marchesi and Thomas, 1999; Marchesi, 2003 and  
4 See IMF (1998) for a detailed description of the IMF’s MULTIMOD forecasting model. 
5 In these studies, the IMF forecast error was also frequently compared with that of some other national 
research institute, e.g., Consensus Economics (an international economic organization in London) which 
are expected to be more independent. Whereas Artis and Loungani find little difference between the IMF 
and Consensus prediction errors, Batchelor shows that the IMF growth forecasts are more biased toward 
optimism and that the IMF inflation forecasts are less biased toward pessimism than the Consensus 
Economics forecasts.   4
Recent evidence from Aldenhoff (2007) indicates that IMF growth forecasts are 
distorted in both industrial and developing regions. In the case of industrial countries, 
who can use their influence at the IMF to obtain favorable outcomes, such an optimistic 
bias is attributed to political reasons: forecasts attract public attention and optimistic ones 
may help incumbents to be reelected. As for developing countries, Aldenhoff attributes 
the bias to the IMF’s own interests in promoting promising prospects for countries 
participating in IMF-sponsored programs. IMF staff may be tempted to produce 
optimistic predictions for the general survival and growth of their lending organization 
and in their personal objectives. Thus, the IMF may either be put under pressure by 
powerful member states, or it may opportunistically make overly optimistic predictions. 
Broadly consistent with this view, Timmermann (2007) finds that WEO forecasts of GDP 
growth display a tendency for systematic overprediction, while he finds a bias toward the 
underprediction of inflation.  
The studies noted above (with the exception of Timmermann, 2007) have 
considered individual country forecasts for only the Group of Seven (G-7), relying on 
regional aggregates for the rest of the world. In this paper, we start by evaluating the 
accuracy of WEO forecasts of GDP growth and inflation (i.e. unbiasedness and 
efficiency) using panel data for individual developing countries, as opposed to regional 
averages. We choose to consider growth and inflation forecasts because both play an 
important role in public discussions and are easily interpreted. By employing country-
specific data, we are able to test hypotheses that cannot be tested on a regional basis. 
After testing for the presence of bias in the IMF’s economic forecasts, we then 
seek to explain the bias. We consider the potential political and reputational motivations 
of the IMF. We also consider reasons having to do with the specific mandate of the IMF 
– ensuring the stability of the international monetary system.  
Regarding politically strategic motivations, we consider the influence of the most 
powerful members of the IMF. Influence at the IMF is explicitly tied to the economic size 
of members. Clearly, the top five shareholders at the IMF – the US, Japan, Germany,   5
France and the United Kingdom – control major Fund decisions.
6 With about 17 percent 
of the total votes, the US by itself has veto power over major decisions at the IMF, 
including the appointment of the IMF Managing Director, which requires an 85 percent 
supermajority. There is ample evidence that the Fund’s major shareholders use their 
influence to pursue political objectives.
7 Thacker (1999), for example, shows that 
governments that vote along the lines of the US on key issues in the United Nations 
General Assembly are more likely to participate in IMF programs – presumably the IMF 
loan acts as a reward. Stone (2002, 2004) shows that governments favored by the US (as 
measured by the amount of US foreign aid disbursed to a country) receive lighter 
punishments for noncompliance with policy conditions under IMF programs. The recent 
empirical literature on political influences on the IMF shows that developing countries 
get better treatment from the IMF when they have closer ties with the US and other G-7 
countries, as measured by their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Barro and 
Lee 2005, Vreeland 2005, Oatley and Yackee 2004, Dreher and Jensen 2007, 
Copelovitch 2007) and while being temporary members of the UN Security Council 
(Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2006).
8 
To the extent that governments benefit from optimistic economic forecasts, it 
follows from the previous literature that the Fund’s major shareholders and their allies 
should receive such forecasts because of the way political power is wielded at the IMF. In 
comparison, countries opposed to the major shareholders are likely to receive more 
pessimistic forecasts. Arguably, the IMF cannot credibly produce just any forecast it 
might wish, and so there should be a limit to any such bias. 
Beyond furthering the political interests of its major shareholders, the Fund might 
have other interests in providing biased forecasts. In the case of developing countries, for 
example, overly optimistic forecasts may serve to justify IMF lending programs. 
Marchesi and Sabani (2007a, 2007b) show that the Fund’s concern with its reputation of 
being a good monitor/advisor might distort its lending decisions away from punishing 
                                                 
6 These members alone control nearly 40 percent of the vote share and are the only countries that 
automatically have seats on the IMF 24 member Executive Board. The rest of the world vies for 
representation through elections and shared seats. 
7 See Fratianni and Pattison (2005) for a recent survey. See Gisselquist (1981), Loxley (1986) and 
Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006) for anedoctal evidence. 
8 Also consider Broz and Hawes (2006), Faini and Grilli (2004), Rieffel (2003), Woods (2003).   6
non-compliance with economic reforms. Such departures from the social optimum are 
associated with countries that have a longer relationship with the Fund. Consistent with 
this idea, Goldsbrough et al. (2002, Table 2, p4) show that the performance criteria for 
the programs of prolonged users often have an optimistic bias, especially regarding 
projections of real GDP growth and export growth. We thus expect forecast bias to 
increase with the duration of the lending relationship between a country and the Fund. 
The IMF may also care about its reputation of being a good manager of its 
resources. To put it bluntly, the Fund may care about getting repaid. To avoid reporting a 
loss in its balance sheets, the IMF may have a perverse incentive to extend new loans to 
borrowers with repayment difficulties to ensure that the existing loans are paid back on 
schedule (Ramcharan 2001, 2003). Such “defensive lending” may be accompanied with 
optimistic “defensive forecasts.” Accordingly, we expect the forecast bias to increase 
with the amount of outstanding loans a country has from the IMF (relative to GDP). 
Finally, we consider an explanation of forecast bias related to the IMF’s concern 
for worldwide economic stability. Since the IMF has the specific mandate of preserving 
the stability of the international monetary system, it might want to avoid the 
responsibility of being blamed for self-fulfilling prophecies. Its forecasts are thus likely to 
be more optimistic when economic stability is at risk. 
To anticipate our results, we do find a systematic bias in IMF forecasts, broadly 
consistent with previous studies. We find that the IMF is overly optimistic about inflation 
for high-income OECD countries, and overly pessimistic about growth for non-OECD 
countries. 
The major contribution of our paper is, however, to explain the bias. We identify 
the characteristics of countries when they receive optimistic and pessimistic forecasts. 
Our results indicate that countries voting in line with the US in the UN General Assembly 
receive lower inflation forecasts. The effect for inflation appears to be particularly strong 
when governments face upcoming elections. As the US is the Fund’s major shareholder, 
this result supports the hypothesis that the Fund’s forecasts are not purely based on 
economic considerations.   7
We also find some limited evidence of the defensive forecasting hypothesis. The 
Fund’s inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for countries that are 
more heavily indebted to the IMF.  
Finally, we find that countries with a fixed exchange rate regime receive lower 
inflation forecasts. Considering the detrimental effects that inflation can have under such 
an exchange rate regime, we consider this evidence consistent with the Fund’s desire to 
preserve economic stability. Whether this is motivated by wishful thinking or by the 
actual effect that biased forecasts can have is beyond the purview of this paper. 
We continue as follows. The next section presents our hypotheses. Section three 
tests for any bias or inefficiency in the forecasts of the IMF. Section four describes our 
data on the variables we use to explain bias in IMF forecasts and the method we use to 
test our hypotheses. Our results are presented in section five. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
We suspect that IMF surveillance produces overly optimistic forecasts for growth and 
inflation. Our analysis distinguishes between three sets of explanations of such optimism: 
(1) politically strategic, (2) defensive forecasting, and (3) stability mandate oriented. We 
consider each in turn. 
 
Politically Strategic Hypotheses 
The first set of hypotheses derive from politically strategic arguments, according to which 
the Fund may be pressured, either explicitly or implicitly, by the governments of the 
member states to make overly optimistic economic forecasts. 
  We suspect that governments are interested in optimistic forecasts, as economic 
environments perceived to be “good” may increase approval by their citizens. True, 
deviations from overly optimistic forecasts might harm politicians in the longer run. The 
public may have high expectations and see government policy as failing. Yet, as 
politicians are usually rather short-sighted (e.g. Lagerspetz, 1999), we think it is likely 
that politicians do – on average – want the future economic environment to look as 
positive as possible.   8
Arguably, optimistic forecasts are more important for the government at some 
times than at others. In election years, the benefits of positive forecasts are obvious. 
Forecasts attract public attention and may influence the way voters evaluate the policy 
performance of their governments: optimistic forecasts may help the incumbent to win 
elections. We expect, therefore, incumbents to be especially interested in optimistic 
forecasts prior to a national election. As Aldenhoff’s (2007) time series analysis for the 
US shows, over optimism is indeed significantly more prevalent prior to elections. We 
expect to find a similar pattern for countries that are important to the IMF. 
Because the IMF depends on the support of its member governments, it may be 
tempted to produce forecasts biased in their favor. The IMF may be pressured by the 
governments of developed and developing countries alike. Whether and to what extent 
the IMF will serve the interests of governments, however, depends on the power they 
enjoy at the Fund, and the support they receive from other powerful members (Dreher, 
2004).
9 As Bird and Rowlands (2003) argue, a government’s power to negotiate depends 
greatly on the willingness of other countries to support it. According to Gould (2003, 
2006), the IMF also responds to pressure from private banks, as evidenced by the fact that 
IMF programs include conditions that support their interests. To the extent that the 
private banks benefit from optimistic forecasts in a country, governments important to 
such institutions may receive favorable forecasts from the IMF. 
Based on the politically strategic arguments, we thus expect: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater a country’s direct influence at the Fund, the more 
optimistic the IMF’s forecasts are for that country. 
Hypothesis 2: Allies of the Fund’s major stakeholders receive more optimistic IMF 
forecasts. 
Hypothesis 3: Major IMF shareholders and their allies receive more optimistic 
forecasts at election time. 
                                                 
9 We should also note that there is interplay between the Fund and national authorities as advanced 
economies and the largest developing countries provide a full set of projections for each WEO exercise 
while the smallest countries provide updates of key variables only.   9
Note that we leave it open whether powerful countries explicitly pressure the IMF, or 
whether the Fund recognizes their implicit preferences and pursues them 
opportunistically, hoping to please the most important funders of the IMF. We consider 




Defensive Forecasting Hypotheses 
Our second set of hypotheses focuses on the IMF’s incentives to make optimistic 
forecasts in order to sustain its lending activity in developing countries and to protect its 
reputation as a competent international financial organization. Such motivations may lead 
the IMF to engage in “defensive forecasting.” 
The IMF may forecast optimistically hoping to defend outstanding loans. This 
argument follows from ideas about “defensive lending,” where the Fund lends to 
countries so deeply in debt they may not be able to make their next scheduled repayment. 
Hence, one reason the Fund may decide to extend new loans to borrowers with repayment 
difficulties is to ensure that existing debt is serviced on schedule, in order to avoid to 
report a loss in its balance sheets. 
If the country does not adopt policy changes to ameliorate its economic situation, 
of course, rolling over the debt simply postpones the default crisis.
10 When engaging in 
defensive lending, the IMF must believe – or least claim to believe – that a country’s 
economy policy, and consequently the economic situation, is going to improve. 
Otherwise, defensive lending is obviously foolhardy. We suspect that these situations are 
likely to lead to either an intentional or an unintentional positive bias in IMF forecasting. 
As countries with a higher stock of IMF debt relative to the total amount of IMF 
outstanding credit are the most likely to receive defensive loans, we also expect them to 
receive defensive forecasts. 
                                                 
10 Therefore, to understand the Fund’s defensive lending, we should refer either to some “political cost” 
borne by current IMF officials after a borrower’s inability to pay has become public (as current officials 
have a shorter horizon than the institution they work for), or to the possibility that postponing default might 
come at a relatively lower pecuniary cost due to, for example, catalytic finance (Shin and Morris, 2005) or 
to future debt relief programs (Ramcharan, 2001, 2003).   10
There are other ways in which the IMF may use forecasts to defend its lending. In 
particular, Marchesi and Sabani (2007a, 2007b) explicitly model the political costs of the 
dual role played by the Fund, acting at the same time as a lender and as a monitor/advisor 
of economic policy. To the extent that the IMF is responsible for the bad economic 
performance of a country, a borrower’s inability to repay may hurt the reputation of the 
IMF as the steward of sound economic policy. Reputational costs can be severe for the 
IMF. For example, the most powerful Fund members might refrain from increasing the 
Fund’s resources if its reputation as good manager of “public resources” is damaged. 
When the IMF has lent to a country that has continued to experience poor 
economic performance, the IMF may find its reputation in jeopardy for at least three 
reasons. First, the Fund may indeed have prescribed the wrong economic policies. 
Second, the Fund may have been incapable of detecting deviations from the prescribed 
policies. Third, the Fund may have been incapable of credibly threatening the interruption 
of financial assistance to enforce policy changes.  
For all of these reasons, the IMF looks bad when it is forced to cut off a country 
from borrowing because of the country’s poor economic performance. Failure to 
refinance a country – particularly countries with longer histories of borrowing from the 
Fund – confirm the IMF’s failure as a lender and a policy monitor/advisor, since this 
outcome is partly caused by the past advice of the IMF. The empirical results of Marchesi 
and Sabani show, indeed, that a longer history of IMF lending does increase the 
probability of IMF loan disbursements. Therefore, the desire to justify its lending activity 
may lead the IMF to over optimism when engaging in surveillance. Specifically, we 
expect that the longer the relationship with the borrowing country, the stronger the effect 
on forecasting. 
Based on the defensive forecasting arguments, we thus expect: 
Hypothesis 4: Countries with a higher stock of debt owed to the Fund (relative to 
the total amount of IMF credit), receive more optimistic IMF forecasts. 
Hypothesis 5: Countries with longer IMF relations receive more optimistic forecasts. 
Stability Mandate Hypotheses   11
The third set of hypotheses is related to the IMF’s primary responsibility of overseeing 
the stability of the international monetary system. One basic principal of this “mandate” 
is that the actions of the IMF certainly should not spread financial crises. 
With respect to inflation, the mandate has direct implications. It is widely 
believed that monetary policy is mainly about expectations – particularly coordinating 
expectations. To the extent that a negative forecast can actually precipitate crises, the 
IMF may systematically tend towards optimism. An overly pessimistic forecast would 
lead to expectations of high inflation, unnecessarily putting excessive pressure on the 
exchange rate. This is particularly true for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Flexible exchange rates can withstand slight deviations, whereas the announcement of 
high inflation for a fixed currency could completely undermine its value. Since financial 
crises are often associated with countries under a fixed exchange rate regime, and since 
the expectations of high inflation would lead to pressure on the exchange rate, we expect 
to find more optimistic forecasts for countries with fixed exchange rates. 
Overly pessimistic growth forecasts could precipitate crises in other situations. 
The expectation of low growth could affect debt sustainability undermining the stability 
of the international monetary system. If a forecast for growth is low enough, it could 
provoke a stampede of creditors. This is particularly true for short term and dollar 
denominated sovereign debt. Given the correlation between financial crises and the ratio 
of debt to GDP (especially short term and dollar denominated sovereign debt) we expect 
a tendency of the IMF to announce more optimistic growth forecasts for countries with 
higher short-term debt to GDP ratios. 
Based on the stability mandate forecasting arguments, we thus expect: 
Hypothesis 6: Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime have more optimistic 
inflation forecasts. 
Hypothesis 7: Countries with a higher (short-term) debt to GDP ratio have more 
optimistic growth forecasts.   12
In order to test the hypotheses laid out above, we employ a wide range of explanatory 
variables. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses and presents the definitions and sources of 
our explanatory variables. Before testing our explanations of bias, however, we first 
explore how much overall forecast bias, if any, there is. The next section tests for the bias 
and efficiency of IMF forecasts. 
 
3. Testing for Bias and Efficiency 
We begin our analysis by replicating the previous work on IMF economic forecasts with 
our data. Timmermann (2007) finds that the overprediction bias for GDP growth and the 
underprediction bias for inflation are stronger in the longer time horizon forecasts. We 
believe this is because the longer the time horizon the greater the room for discretionary 
forecasting.
11 Thus, we focus on the longest run forecasts available. The WEO publishes 
four types of forecasts: spring forecasts for the current and the following year, and fall 
forecasts for the current and the following year. We focus on fall forecasts for the 
following year. Our data are organized in an unbalanced panel including a maximum of 
157 developed and developing countries over the period 1999-2005. 
The accuracy of a forecast is based on the properties of the forecast error. A 
forecast is considered to be accurate if it is unbiased and efficient.  
A forecast is unbiased if its average deviation from the outcome is zero. Bias may 
be identified with the significance of the mean forecast error, as indicated by a simple 
regression of the error on a constant term, testing whether it is significantly different from 
zero (Holden and Peel, 1990). 
For each country i during year t, define  it it it R F e − ≡ , where e represents forecast 
error,  F denotes the forecast, and R denotes its respective realization. The test for 
biasedness is based on the regression expressed as: 
  it it u e + = µ , (1) 
with uit being an i.i.d. residual and where µ  is a constant term. We define the mean 
forecast error (ME) as: 
                                                 














= , (2) 
With T being the number of years and I the number of countries in our sample. 
Forecast efficiency implies that the deviation between the outcome and the 
projection is not related to information available at the time the projection was made 
(Barrionuevo, 1993; Holden and Peel, 1990). This condition is tested by measuring the 
statistical significance of the co-movements between the deviation of the outcome of the 
forecast and the forecast itself (β-test), and the co-movement between the deviation of the 
outcome of the forecast in the current period and that in the previous period (ρ-test). β is 
estimated by a least-squares regression of the forecast error on a constant and the forecast 
(equation 3), and ρ is estimated by a regression of the current-period forecast error on a 
constant and the previous period error (equation 4). Therefore, a condition for efficiency 
is that both β and ρ be zero.  
  it it i i it u F e + + = β α , (3) 
  it it i i it u e e + + = −1 ρ γ , (4) 
where e and F denote forecast error and forecast, respectively, and α  and γ  are constant 
terms (with uit again being an i.i.d. residual). 
If β and ρ are both different from zero, the inefficiency is partly due to the way in 
which new information is incorporated into projected values and partly because the 
present errors are highly correlated with past ones (Barrionuevo, 1993; Pons, 2000).  
Table 2 reports the results for high-income OECD countries and other countries 
separately.
12 As can be seen from columns (1) and (2), IMF forecasts are indeed biased. 
In high-income OECD countries, inflation forecasts are optimistic. They are significantly 
biased downwards, at the one percent level of significance. Specifically, the average 
inflation forecast in those countries is 0.24 percentage points lower than actual 
realizations. The Fund’s growth forecasts, in contrast, are too pessimistic for non-OECD 
countries, with a coefficient significant at the five percent level. The forecast is, on 
average, 0.36 percentage points lower as compared to realizations. We detect no bias for 
OECD growth forecasts or non-OECD inflation forecasts. 
                                                 
12 As classified by the World Bank (2006a).   14
Turning to our tests for efficiency, columns (3) and (4) show that the previous 
error in estimating inflation contributes to explaining the current error for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries. The effect is positive and significant at the one percent level. 
The same is true regarding growth forecasts for non-OECD countries. As columns (5) 
and (6) show, in non-OECD countries, the magnitude of the error significantly depends 
on the magnitude of the forecast itself, with higher forecasts implying bigger mistakes. 
Our results confirm, to an extent, previous studies that show bias and inefficiency 
in IMF forecasts. The bias is not across all estimates. Yet, the existence of an overall bias 
is not necessary for our subsequent analysis. Even if, on average, bias is zero, it is 
possible that forecasts for some types of situations are systematically high, while for 
others they are systematically low. The next section presents our strategy to test if bias is 
related to any of our previously presented hypotheses. 
 
4. Data and Method 
We test our hypotheses by regressing the forecast error on the variables suggested above. 
Specifically, we test: 
  it i it it it u F HYP e + + + + = η β β α 2
'
1 , (5) 
where  eit represents the forecast error in country i at year t, and HYP is a vector 
containing the variables introduced above (see Table 1). Note that we also include the 
level of the forecast (F), given its significance in most specifications above. Finally, ηi 
are country fixed effects.
13 
A potential problem with this specification is that the within-groups estimator is 
biased and inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a short panel 
(Nickell 1981). Thus, as a test for robustness, we employ the system GMM estimator as 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The dynamic panel GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent data. 
It is considered most appropriate in the presence of endogenous regressors. Results are 
based on the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including 
                                                 
13 The Hausman test rejects a random effects specification. We also tested time dummies, but they are not 
jointly significant, so we do not include them.   15
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. We apply the Sargan-Hansen test on the 
validity of the instruments used (amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates) 
and the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must be absent from 
the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. We treat the lagged dependent variable 
and the economic variables as endogenous and all other variables as predetermined. To 
anticipate the results, the Sargan-Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do not reject 
these specifications at conventional levels of significance. 
Turning to the variables employed to test our hypotheses (the HYP vector), 
“power” (H1) is proxied by (log) GDP, following Dreher (2004).
14 Both a country’s own 
(direct) influence in the Fund and support by other countries arguably rise with the size of 
its economy. Moreover, countries with higher GDP are more important for the world 
economy. This variable is measured in constant 2000 US$, taken from the World Bank’s 
(2006a)  World Development Indicators. Ideally, we would also employ a country’s 
“quota,” the capital subscription each member holds on deposit at the IMF that directly 
determines its voting power. However, given that our analysis includes dummies for each 
country and that quotas’ variability is very limited over time, we cannot use it.  
We test the influence of private creditors (H2) by including countries’ arrears on 
private debt, taken from World Bank (2006b). Sometimes governments press the IMF to 
lend to countries which are in arrears to them or to their banks (Dreher 2004). The Fund 
might want to present an optimistic forecast in order to avoid outright default.  
Next, we employ two proxies for countries’ standing with the Fund’s most 
important stakeholder (H2). We follow the bulk of literature and employ data on voting 
coincidence in the UN General Assembly as provided by Voeten (2004). In particular, we 
follow Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement with the US as 1, votes in 
disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are then 
divided by the total number of votes in each year. This results in a variable ranging from 
zero to one, with zero indicating total disagreement with the U.S., and one showing full 
agreement.  
Clearly, the amount of effort a country puts on influencing others will depend on 
the importance of a vote. Not all votes in the General Assembly are likely to be of great 
                                                 
14 Descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.   16
importance to the US. Focusing the analysis on a sub-set of votes might thus be superior. 
However, inclusion of all votes has also been defended. Wittkopf (1973) states that none 
of the alternatives focusing on “important” votes is preferable to the general approach. 
Wittkopf replicates his overall results including only those votes on which the US and the 
Soviet Union disagreed, finding that the results do not differ substantially from the 
analysis including all votes. Similarly, he replicates the previous analysis of Russett 
(1967), and also finds no substantial differences between “important” votes and all votes. 
Moreover, while the US State Department provides a classification of votes they consider 
of particular importance, the transmission of US foreign policy preferences from the State 
Department to the IMF is not necessarily a direct one (Thacker 1999), as it is mainly the 
Treasury controlling the IMF (Kahler 1990). The State Department’s preferences might 
thus not give a good indication as to actual lobbying efforts. We thus follow most of the 
recent literature and include all votes in our analysis (e.g. Dreher and Sturm 2006). 
The recent work in Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2006) suggests an additional 
proxy for US and other major Fund members’ interests. Their analysis shows that non-
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are more likely to receive 
IMF programs and fewer conditions under these programs. They attribute this to the 
influence of the Fund’s major shareholders, bribing or rewarding temporary members of 
the Security Council to vote according to their interests. Consequently, we include 
temporary Security Council membership as an additional variable.  
In testing the influence of elections for important countries (H3), we include a 
variable measuring the share of a certain year that is within 12 months prior to a national 
(legislative or executive) election, and include its interaction with a measure of country 
importance. To capture the importance of a country, we use the previously mentioned 
variable capturing voting inline with the US in the UN General Assembly. Data on 
elections is taken from Dreher and Vaubel (2007) based on Beck et al. (1999), and has 
been updated employing various sources, so data are available until 2006. The underlying 
idea is that the closer the elections for important countries, the stronger the bias in 
optimism should be.    17
Our first defensive forecasting hypothesis (H4) is tested by including each 
country’s outstanding credit in percent of IMF total outstanding credit under all IMF 
facilities (as provided by the World Bank, 2006b).  
For our other defensive forecasting hypothesis (H5), the duration of the Fund’s 
relationship with a country is proxied by a variable that progressively numbers the years 
spent consecutively by a country under a Fund arrangement, since 1970.
15  
Our classification of exchange rate regimes (H6) follows Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005). They provide an index of de facto exchange rates on a scale from 
one to five, with higher values reflecting more rigid exchange rate systems. Short-term 
debt relative to GDP (H7), finally, is taken from the World Bank’s (2006b) Global 
Development Finance. 




We estimate our panel for a maximum of 157 countries for the period 1999 to 2005 both 
by OLS with country specific effects and with GMM.
16 Table 3 presents the results of the 
estimation of equation (5) for the determinants of the inflation bias. Table 4 presents 
robustness tests. Tables 5 and 6 replicate the analysis for economic growth forecasts. 
First, consider our primary findings for inflation (Table 3). Column 1 includes 
GDP in addition to the forecasts. The following columns add the variables referring to 
our specific hypotheses one at the time, while column 5 shows the full model (estimated 
with OLS). 
Consistent with the results of our test for efficiency (Table 2), the forecast error 
rises with the forecast itself. Larger forecasts are associated with more bias. 
Turning to one of our main variables of interest, inflation forecasts are more 
optimistic for countries with higher arrears on private debt, in line with our a priori 
                                                 
15 When the IMF program spell is interrupted this variable goes to zero and, as soon as a new program 
begins (after an interval of at least one year), we start counting again. See Marchesi and Sabani (2007b), 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003).  
16 Since the hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation is rejected by the data, we estimate a fixed effects 
linear models with an AR(1) disturbance.    18
expectations. The result is significant at the one percent level when we control for other 
variables. 
Interestingly, we find inflation forecasts are generally more pessimistic at election 
time, but are more optimistic for closer friends of the US. Calculating the marginal 
effects of the interacted election and voting with the US variables, the results show that 
the inflation forecast increases by 5.2 percentage points when the election variable 
changes from zero to one for countries voting at the minimum value of the UN voting 
variable (0.10), significant at the five percent level (not shown in the table). At the 
maximum value of 0.95, the inflation forecast is reduced by 5.3 percentage points, but 
just fails to be significant at the 10 percent level (p-value of 0.112).
17 This result is 
consistent with the idea that the IMF may be tempted to produce forecasts biased in favor 
of “friends” of its major shareholder and treat countries that are not friends of the US 
unfavorably. The positive effect of the election variable itself is consistent with the 
hypothesis of the political monetary cycle (e.g. Dreher and Vaubel, 2007), namely with 
the idea that the IMF expects inflation to increase following the election. Apparently, 
however, their expectations are too pessimistic.  
Countries with fixed exchange rates also obtain better inflation forecasts as the 
coefficient of the variable for a fixed exchange rate regime is negative and significant at 
the one percent level. This result confirms the hypothesis that the IMF is more willing to 
produce optimistic inflation forecasts for countries which are more exposed to the risk of 
financial crises due to their exchange rate regime. Specifically, an increase in the 
exchange rate indicator by one point reduces the inflation forecast by 0.65 percentage 
points. 
The results also show, however, that in contrast to our expectations, the size of a 
country’s economy (measured by GDP) and temporary membership in the UN Security 
Council do not matter for the forecast bias. In addition, all IMF-related variables are 
completely insignificant. Specifically, the amount of debt owed to the Fund (relative to 
the total amount of Fund credit) and the number of years spent consecutively under an 
IMF arrangement do not affect the forecast bias.  
                                                 
17 However, the marginal effects for UN voting at the minimum and maximum of the election index fail to 
be significant at conventional levels (not shown in the table).    19
In column 6 of Table 3 we replicate the analysis employing the consistent GMM 
estimator. Note that the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test do not reject the 
specification at conventional levels of significance. As can be seen, the lagged dependent 
variable fails to be significant at conventional levels, supporting the validity of our 
previous OLS estimates. The OLS results displayed in column 5 are generally confirmed 
– with two exceptions, however. The coefficient for the amount of arrears on private debt 
is not significant, and inflation forecasts are significantly lower for countries with a 
higher share of the IMF loan portfolio. Arguably, the latter finding provides evidence that 
the IMF cares about its reputation as a good manager of its resources. It does not like 
financing apparently “bad performing” countries, so it is tempted to provide overly 
optimistic projections to justify its lending activity. 
Table 4 tests the robustness of these results. First, we replicate the analysis – with 
both OLS and GMM – excluding high income OECD countries from our sample 
(columns 1 and 2) and separating countries with high and low country risk ratings, as 
produced by Institutional Investor (columns 3-6)
18 The rationale for these robustness tests 
rests in the way in which forecasts are made. To some extent, the IMF’s economic 
forecasts are the result of an interaction between those responsible for compiling the 
forecasts at the IMF and members of the various area departments who frequently have 
access to official national forecasts for the countries under investigation.
19 Excluding 
high-income OECD countries might be important, as interactions between IMF staff 
members and country officials might be different in these countries, as compared to the 
rest of the sample.
20 Arguing along similar lines, we would also expect the interaction 
between staff and country officials to be different in countries with high as compared to 
low credit risk.  
As can be seen from the table, excluding high-income OECD countries does not 
affect the results (Table 4, columns 1 and 2). However, some differences arise when we 
exclude the countries in the highest four percentiles of the country risk ratings. We 
                                                 
18 Institutional Investor publishes a rating specifically for “country credit” (essentially, sovereign risk). We 
thank Carmen Reinhart for providing these data (as used in Reinhart et al., 2003).  
19 Kenen and Schwartz (1986).  
20 We do not report separate results for OECD countries due to the small number of observations.   20
choose this cut-off as it splits the sample approximately in half, according to the OLS 
estimates.
21  
According to the OLS estimates in column 3, we find that the IMF loan share is 
significant at conventional levels and with the expected sign. Surprisingly, the fixed 
exchange rate regime is not significant anymore, but, consistent with H1, we find that the 
size of GDP induces more optimistic inflation forecasts. In the GMM specification most 
of the results are consistent with those previously obtained but with some differences: the 
lagged dependent variable is now significant and, surprisingly, both the size of GDP and 
the dummy for being a temporary UNSC member induce less optimistic inflation 
forecasts.  
Finally, where we strongly reduce our sample in order to include only countries 
with high risk rating (last two columns), only with the GMM specification do we obtain 
coefficients that are significant. As before, we find that inflation forecasts are more 
optimistic for countries voting in line with the US at election times (where the pre-
election index is still positive and significant) and for countries with a fixed exchange 
rate regime. For obvious reasons, the share of a country’s debt in the IMF loan portfolio 
is not significant here. With riskier countries, the IMF needs to be cautious. 
Turning to our estimates of growth forecast bias, Table 5, column 4, presents the 
OLS estimates for the full model. As can be seen, the forecast error is positively related 
to the forecast itself. Most of our hypotheses, however, receive no support. The only 
hypothesis that is not rejected by the data is H2: countries voting in line with the US 
obtain more optimistic forecasts. None of the other variables are significant, with the 
exception of the variable indicating the number of years consecutively spent under an 
IMF program, but the coefficient has the “wrong” sign: countries with longer histories 
with the IMF receive overly pessimistic growth forecasts. While there is plenty of 
evidence that IMF programs are bad for economic growth,
22 it thus seems even the IMF 
is too pessimistic in countries with a long history of IMF arrangements. 
In the GMM specification (last column of Table 5) the only variable that is 
significant with the expected sign is voting in line with the US. This confirms again our 
                                                 
21 Note that – due to the inclusion of an AR(1) term – we loose a substantial amount of observations in the 
OLS regressions as compared to the GMM specification. 
22 See Vreeland (2007) for a review.    21
hypothesis that friends of the IMF’s most important shareholder do obtain more 
optimistic growth forecasts. However, while the result is robust to the exclusion of high-
income OECD countries (first column in Table 6) and, consistently, to the exclusion of 
low risk countries (column 5, Table 6), quite surprisingly, the coefficient of UN voting 
becomes significantly negative once countries with high risk rating are excluded (column 
3, Table 6). Overall, therefore, our hypotheses clearly find less support for growth, as 
compared to inflation forecasts. As possible explanation, growth forecasts might be more 




Following the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, calls came from across the 
political spectrum for the IMF to get out of the lending business. The calls were heard. 
These days lending is way down at the IMF. Emerging market countries are finding 
alternatives to IMF loans that are not tied to IMF policy conditions. The IMF finds itself 
tightening its belt as the revenue it has generated in the past from lending is beginning to 
dry up. Like many times in its past, the IMF is looking for a new primary purpose from 
among the various functions laid out in the Articles of Agreement.  
The IMF’s new raison d’etre appears to be surveillance. Already accounting for 
the largest part of its budgetary resources, Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato 
announced in 2006 that the IMF would explore “new directions in surveillance,” 
including strengthening the analysis presented in the WEO: 
The difficulties in tackling unprecedented global imbalances and the challenges 
facing individual countries underscore the need for stronger exercise of the 
Fund’s policy analysis and advice to its member countries, a process known as 
surveillance.
23 
Past lending activities of the IMF have been plagued by political problems, both 
international and domestic. These problems contributed to the disappointing results that 
prompted calls for the IMF to cut back its lending activities. As the IMF shifts focus from 
                                                 
23 The IMF “Medium Term Strategy”: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2006/041806.htm (accessed 
September 9, 2007).   22
“lender” to “monitor,” it is important to ask whether political problems will plague this 
activity of the IMF as well. 
Using panel data for a maximum of 157 countries over the period 1999-2005, we 
have empirically investigated the politics involved in IMF economic forecasts. We find a 
systematic bias in growth and inflation forecasts. Our results indicate that countries 
voting in line with the US in the UN General Assembly receive better inflation and – 
depending on the sample of countries included in the analysis – growth forecasts. As the 
US is the Fund’s major shareholder this result supports the hypothesis that the Fund’s 
forecasts are not purely based on economic considerations. Our results also confirm the 
defensive forecasting hypothesis as inflation forecasts are systematically biased 
downwards for countries more heavily indebted to the IMF. 
Although the empirical work has revealed some strong patterns in the data, much 
remains to be done. So far, we have only considered the IMF as monolithic entity. A 
potentially fruitful extension would be to take into account the interactions, within the 
IMF, between the various executive directors and the IMF staff and officials. It would 
also be interesting to explore the interaction of the IMF staff and officials with monitored 
countries. For example, the incentives of vulnerable members of the IMF staff may lead 
them to downplay risk to avoid mistakes. Such perverse incentives could lead to a lack of 
accurate surveillance. 
If the IMF is to remain relevant by increasing surveillance endeavors, Fund 
forecasts must be free from political and opportunistic bias. The importance of this 
activity requires scholars of the IMF to investigate whether and to what extent IMF 
surveillance is laden with political and self-serving interests. As surveillance becomes the 
central focus of IMF activity, it should also become a central part of the research agenda 
on the international institution. 
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Monetary Fund. Table 1: Variables definition  
Hypotheses Proxies  Variables  Source 
      
H1: Direct influence in the Fund  “Power”   GDP   World Bank (2006a) 
      
H2: Indirect influence in the 
Fund 
Influence of private creditors  Arrears on private debt   World Bank (2006b) 
  Countries’ standing with the Fund’s 
most important shareholder (US) 
Percentage of votes within a year 
which are in line with the US  
Voeten (2004)  
  Temporary members of the UN 
Security Council  
Dummy for temporary UNSC 
membership  
Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2006)  
      
H3: More optimistic forecasts at 
election time  
Influence of elections  Share of the year prior to the 
elections  
Dreher and Vaubel (2007) 
  Influence of voting in line with the 
US in the pre-election time  
Interaction between voting in line 
with the US and the pre-election 
variable 
 
      
H4: Defensive forecasting due to  Influence of a higher stock of debt  IMF loan share   IMF (2006) & IMF webpage   30
the political costs of a default  owed to the Fund 
      
H5: Defensive forecasting due to 
“reputational effect” 
Influence of the length of the 
relationship with the IMF 
Number of past consecutive 
arrangements 
IMF (2006) & IMF webpage 
H6: Influence of the IMF 
mandate on inflation  
Influence of the IMF mandate of 
ensuring stability on inflation 
Fixed exchange rate regime   World Bank (2006b) 
H7: Influence of the IMF 
mandate on growth  
Influence of the IMF mandate of 
ensuring stability on growth 
Short term to GDP ratio   World Bank (2006b) 
 Table 2: Bias and Efficiency, OLS  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bias  Previous  error  Forecast 
  Inflation Growth Inflation Growth Inflation Growth 
OECD  countries  -0.237 0.147 0.299 0.122 0.008 -0.070 
 (3.54)***  (1.31)  (4.08)***  (1.56) (0.11) (0.64) 
Number  of  countries  22 23 22 23 22 23 
Number  of  observations  146 152 130 136 146 152 
        
        
non-OECD  countries  0.248 -0.362 0.458 0.142 0.319 0.468 
  (0.41)  (2.25)**  (10.27)*** (2.81)*** (31.81)*** (9.59)*** 
Number  of  countries  133 146 133 141 133 146 
Number  of  observations  562 600 427 451 562 600 
  
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
   32
Table 3: Explaining the Bias in INFLATION Forecasts 
  HP1  HP2 HP3 HP4 ALL  HP  ALL  HP 
  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM 
Forecast  (t)  1.083  1.109 1.098 1.102 1.119 0.140 
  (16.94)***  (16.89)*** (16.89)*** (16.70)*** (18.42)*** (2.34)** 
GDP  (log)  0.068  0.915 0.895 0.982 0.378 0.364 
  (0.05)  (0.64) (0.63) (0.68) (0.43) (1.23) 
Arrears (relative to GDP)    -43.950  -45.928  -49.988  -75.578  27.180 
   (1.42)  (1.50)  (1.58)  (2.71)***  (0.66) 
UNSC  dummy    0.320 0.200 0.117 0.204 1.240 
    (0.27) (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (1.07) 
Voting with USA    -21.158  -21.500  -21.747  -2.496  -3.213 
    (2.24)** (2.28)** (2.30)** (0.27)  (0.80) 
Pre-election  period      6.069 6.123 6.491 5.768 
      (2.18)** (2.18)** (2.43)** (2.72)*** 
Voting*pre-election      -11.202 -11.196 -12.362 -11.056 
      (1.83)* (1.81)* (2.15)**  (2.63)*** 
IMF loan share        -32.755  -26.847  -33.032 
       (0.47)  (0.42)  (3.04)*** 
Consecutive IMF         -0.039  0.103  0.003 
    arrangements        (0.13)  (0.37)  (0.01) 
Fixed  exchange  rate       -0.647  -1.112 
       (1.98)**  (2.02)** 
Lagged dependent             -0.006 
    variable            (0.05) 
Constant  -8.367  -22.101 -21.621 -23.336 -12.826 -4.423 
  (0.41)  (1.01) (1.00) (1.06) (0.91) (0.68) 
Observations  390  390 384 384 359 361 
Number  of  countries  148  148 142 142 131 132 
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-level)        0.14 
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)            1.00 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
OLS regressions include fixed country dummies.  33
Table 4: Explaining the Bias in INFLATION Forecasts (tests for robustness) 












 OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM 
Forecast  (t)  1.125  0.109  1.380  0.812 1.376 0.153 
  (14.87)*** (1.44)  (21.84)***  (3.60)*** (9.99)*** (2.64)*** 
GDP (log)  0.328  0.513  41.887  0.948  -0.118  1.120 
 (0.30)  (0.60)  (3.54)***  (2.36)**  (0.18)  (1.17) 
Arrears (relative to GDP)  -74.665  34.875  -363.031  92.380  26.509  54.782 
  (2.15)**  (0.54)  (4.76)***  (1.61) (0.96) (0.91) 
UNSC  dummy  0.219  2.652  -0.222  1.388 1.261 2.291 
 (0.13)  (1.28)  (0.21)  (1.86)* (0.32)  (0.78) 
Voting with USA  -5.486  -6.166  -16.046  0.877  -11.540  -5.312 
 (0.39)  (1.37)  (1.01)  (0.18) (1.17) (0.76) 
Pre-election period  12.920  11.426  8.425  8.537  -9.909  10.654 
 (2.52)**  (2.63)***  (3.61)***  (2.73)***  (1.10)  (2.30)** 
Voting*pre-election -33.482  -27.549  -15.875  -14.880  20.644  -19.036 
 (2.19)**  (1.91)*  (3.11)***  (2.08)**  (0.94)  (2.28)** 
IMF loan share  -13.010  -42.204  -124.705  -63.519  -674.900  -4.086 
 (0.16)  (2.24)**  (1.79)*  (3.42)***  (0.46)  (0.15) 
Consecutive IMF arrangements  0.153  0.150  0.589  0.050  -0.072  0.212 
 (0.44)  (0.95)  (1.12)  (0.17) (0.29) (1.20) 
Fixed exchange rate  -0.744  -2.766  -0.512  -0.804  0.054  -1.082 
 (1.80)*  (1.98)**  (1.28)  (2.02)**  (0.13)  (1.71)* 
Lagged dependent variable    -0.024    0.568    -0.033 
   (0.22)    (2.39)**    (0.33) 
Constant -12.582  -1.447  -1,077.016  -25.439  -1.054  -21.543 
 (0.74)  (0.07)  (6.80)***  (2.61)***  (0.09)  (1.07) 
Observations  257  259  169  171 113 190 
Number of countries  109  110  53  54  54  131 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)    0.09    0.53    0.98 
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)    0.45    0.98    0.90 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
OLS regressions include fixed country dummies.  34
Table 5: Explaining the Bias in GROWTH Forecasts 
 HP1  HP2  HP3  HP4  ALL  HP  ALL  HP 
  OLS OLS  OLS OLS  OLS  GMM 
Forecast  (t)  0.802  0.792 0.800  0.741 0.763 0.008 
  (4.18)***  (4.20)*** (4.18)***  (3.87)*** (3.98)*** (0.03) 
GDP (log)  -2.085  -1.465  -1.425  -1.378 -1.262 -0.092 
  (2.23)** (1.59) (1.56)  (1.44) (1.28) (0.51) 
Arrears (relative to GDP)    -7.449  -7.700  -8.776  -4.744  -33.970 
    (0.41) (0.42)  (0.47) (0.25) (0.83) 
UNSC  dummy    -0.538 -0.549  -0.547 -0.557 -0.410 
    (0.75) (0.76)  (0.77) (0.79) (1.12) 
Voting with USA    21.566  21.464  20.496  20.521  2.243 
    (4.13)*** (4.07)***  (3.93)*** (3.96)*** (1.65)* 
Pre-election  period      0.743  0.576 0.578 1.208 
      (0.42)  (0.32) (0.33) (0.83) 
Voting*pre-election      -1.471  -0.964 -1.176 -1.212 
      (0.37)  (0.24) (0.30) (0.46) 
IMF loan share        -2.714  -5.891  4.483 
        (0.12) (0.26) (1.00) 
Consecutive IMF arrangements        -0.428  -0.474  0.006 
       (2.40)**  (2.62)***  (0.13) 
Short-term  debt        -14.531  -4.470 
        (1.39)  (1.30) 
Lagged  dependent  variable         0.346 
         (2.98)*** 
Constant  47.464 25.213  24.277 24.375  22.275  1.485 
  (2.42)** (1.30) (1.27)  (1.20) (1.05) (0.32) 
Observations  414  414 408  408 408 406 
Number  of  countries  157  157 151  151 151 151 
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-level)         0.85 
Sargan-Hansen  Test  (p-level)         0.67 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
OLS regressions include fixed country dummies.  35
Table 6: Explaining the Bias in GROWTH Forecasts (tests for robustness) 












 OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM  OLS  GMM 
Forecast (t)  0.788  -0.001  1.763  0.344  0.901  -0.256 
 (3.14)***  (0.00)  (8.11)***  (0.97)  (2.15)**  (0.58) 
GDP (log)  -1.202  -0.111  -38.377  -0.044  0.253  0.673 
 (0.95)  (0.42)  (7.12)***  (0.09)  (0.33)  (2.18)** 
Arrears (relative to GDP)  -8.432  -32.330  -98.690  -67.265  -9.382  -5.941 
 (0.38)  (0.83)  (3.01)*** (1.78)*  (0.44)  (0.14) 
UNSC  dummy  -0.247  -0.243  -0.561 -0.789 3.604  -0.042 
 (0.24)  (0.41)  (0.78)  (1.38) (1.23)  (0.03) 
Voting with USA  25.573  1.570  -32.289  3.312  10.323  0.107 
 (3.73)***  (0.82)  (3.35)***  (1.07)  (1.70)*  (0.04) 
Pre-election period  -1.631  -0.976  1.815  -0.021  -12.883  -1.595 
  (0.48)  (0.37)  (1.06) (0.01) (2.43)**  (0.68) 
Voting*pre-election  5.996  6.131  -7.119 -1.217 34.469  1.849 
 (0.56)  (0.72)  (1.82)*  (0.45)  (2.49)**  (0.29) 
IMF loan share  -7.147  5.482  -21.993  7.051  995.463  -23.816 
  (0.27)  (0.82)  (1.15) (1.29) (1.16)  (2.66)*** 
Consecutive IMF arrangements  -0.469  -0.005  0.151  -0.007  -0.339  0.150 
  (2.21)**  (0.09)  (0.41) (0.03) (1.77)*  (1.76)* 
Short-term debt  -13.804  -3.841  2.651  8.819  -10.442  -0.720 
 (1.12)  (1.05)  (0.12)  (0.42) (1.02)  (0.26) 
Lagged dependent variable    0.354    0.170    0.261 
   (3.17)***    (0.86)    (1.55) 
Constant 19.480  2.065  995.474  -0.720  -14.721  -15.464 
 (0.73)  (0.34)  (7.72)***  (0.05)  (0.96)  (1.94)* 
Observations  302  300  192 193 133  213 
Number of countries  128  128  60  61  67  149 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)    1.00    0.99    0.80 
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)    0.36    0.75    0.48 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
OLS regressions include fixed country dummies. Appendix: Descriptive statistics (estimation sample Table 3, column 5) 
 
Variable   Mean   Std.  Dev.    Min    Max 
          
Bias,  inflation    0.14   11.09  -59.90  157.20 
Bias,  growth   -0.32  3.14   -22.20   13.50 
Forecast, inflation    8.11    32.88    -2.20    522.20 
Forecast,  growth   4.05  2.53  -4.50   42.70 
GDP  (log)   24.18   2.27   19.12  30.01 
Arrears  (relative  to  GDP)   0.00  0.02  0.00  0.18 
UNSC  dummy   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00 
Pre-election  period   0.12  0.21  0.00  1.00 
Voting  with  USA   0.35  0.15  0.10  0.95 
IMF  loan  share   0.01  0.03  0.00  0.27 
Consecutive  IMF  arrangements   1.68  3.09  0.00   15.00 
Fixed  exchange  rate   3.72  1.41  1.00  5.00 
Short-term debt (relative to 
GDP)   0.05  0.08  0.00  0.56 
 